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ABSTRACT 
In the forty-five years since the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(ANCSA) created the Alaska Native regional corporation and village 
corporations, shareholders and outside observers have criticized the statute’s use 
of the traditional corporate form as inappropriate for Alaska Native communities. 
The emergence of the benefit corporation entity across the United States may soon 
mean that Native corporations have a promising alternative. If Alaska joins the 
majority of states that have adopted this new legal entity, Native corporations 
would have an opportunity to significantly reform their corporate governance 
within the existing framework of ANCSA. This Note will argue that Alaska 
should enact a benefit corporation statute because it would give Native 
corporations a legal entity that better fits their purpose. As benefit corporations, 
Native corporations would commit to pursuing public benefits, and their 
directors would be required to consider factors beyond shareholder value in 
making decisions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Forty-five years ago President Richard Nixon signed the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), granting roughly forty-five 
million acres of land and about $1 billion to Alaska’s Native population 
in exchange for relinquishing any other land claims they might have in 
the state.1 ANCSA also directed the incorporation of regional and village 
corporations to manage the resources of Alaska Natives.2 The larger 
regional corporations were required to be organized “for profit” under 
Copyright © 2016 by William Robinson. 
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1. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688
(1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012)). 
2. Id. § 1606(a)–(c).
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Alaska state law.3 Congress and the Alaska Natives who advocated for 
the statute hoped the corporations would foster self-determination 
among Alaska Natives, allowing them to serve as stewards of the land 
and assets they received under ANCSA.4 
Although many have recognized that ANCSA was a significant 
legislative accomplishment for Alaska Natives,5 both Native corporation 
shareholders and outside observers have argued that the corporation was 
the wrong legal entity to effectuate the broad objectives of the Native 
corporations and ANCSA.6 Critics of the Native corporation model have 
argued that corporate law and its imposition of shareholder primacy is at 
odds with Alaska Native culture and many of the broader goals of Native 
corporations.7 For instance, Native corporation shareholders may prefer 
that Native corporation directors be required to consider factors other 
than maximizing dividends and shareholder value.8 While ANCSA 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. See DONALD CRAIG MITCHELL, TAKE MY LAND, TAKE MY LIFE: THE STORY OF 
CONGRESS’S HISTORIC SETTLEMENT OF ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS, 1960-1971 541 
(2001) (“ANCSA was an unprecedented experiment in Native American 
economic self-determination that Alaska Natives actively participated in 
crafting.”). 
 5. See, e.g., id. (arguing that ANCSA was not forced upon Alaska Natives by 
Congress, but that Alaska Natives played a major role in advocating for the law); 
see also Robert T. Anderson, Alaska Native Rights, Statehood, and Unfinished Business, 
43 TULSA L. REV. 17, 32 (2007) (ANCSA “has been praised by many in terms of the 
amounts of land and money awarded, but others have decried [its] failings with 
respect to tribal sovereignty and protection of hunting, fishing, and gathering 
rights.”). 
 6. See Eric C. Chaffee, Business Organizations and Tribal Self-Determination: A 
Critical Reexamination of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 
107, 146 (2008) (arguing that Native corporations should be allowed to operate 
with “nonprofit goals”); see also Morgan Howard, Dividends Do Not Define Success 
for Alaska Native Corporations, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS, Oct. 23, 2014,  
http://www.adn.com/article/20141023/dividends-do-not-define-success-
alaska-native-corporations (arguing that Native corporations have a broader 
purpose than paying out dividends and should instead value the collective over 
the individual in assessing how to benefit shareholders). 
 7. See, e.g., CERT. OF INC., AHTNA INC., ART. III (June 23, 1972) (stating a 
corporate purpose “to promote the economic, social, cultural and personal well-
being of all Natives”); see also Chaffee, supra note 6, at 133 (“One major problem 
with forcing Alaska Native communities to adopt the corporate form is that 
corporations measure success by financial performance, rather than by success in 
land stewardship.”); see also Native corp. charters, etc.; but see Linda O. Smiddy, 
Responding to Professor Janda—The U.S. Experience: The Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA) Regional Corporation as a Form of Social Enterprise, 30 VT. L. 
REV. 823, 825 (2006) (“There is some evidence that Natives have adapted the 
business corporation form to reflect both Native cultural traditions involving 
collective relationships to land and subsistence economies and a Western culture 
characterized by private property, individual rights, and market capitalism.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 6 (writing in an op-ed, Howard, a village 
corporation director, argues that Native corporations should weigh broader 
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requires that regional corporations exist as “for profit” entities under 
Alaska law, some have argued that Native corporations would be better 
off as legal entities that more closely resemble non-profits.9 For the past 
forty-five years, no such quasi-non-profit legal entity has existed in 
Alaska,10 and Native corporations have had no transformative alternative 
option to consider.11 However, that may soon change.12 
In 2016, Alaska’s House of Representatives considered whether to 
pass a bill that would have allowed businesses to incorporate as benefit 
corporations (commonly referred to as “B Corps”) under state law.13 If 
Alaska had passed the benefit corporation statute, it would have joined 
the majority of states that have already enacted similar statutes.14 Under 
the proposed legislation, Native corporation shareholders would have 
been able to vote on whether to convert to benefit corporations.15 If a 
Native corporation became a benefit corporation, its directors would be 
required to consider a range of factors beyond maximizing dividends and 
shareholder value.16 The Native corporation would also need to commit 
to pursuing public benefits, and report biennially on its progress in 
furthering these objectives.17 Directors would risk liability to the public if 
they failed to pursue these broad goals.18 Converting to a benefit 
corporation would be a significant legal transformation for a Native 
corporation. This Note will argue that, given the criticism of Native 
corporations that has persisted since ANCSA’s enactment, Native 
corporations and their shareholders should at least have the chance to 
consider making this transformation. 
Part I of this Note gives an overview of the Alaska Native 
corporations, tracing their history and some criticism received in the last 
 
objectives than dividend maximization). 
 9. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 146. ANCSA requires Native corporations to be 
organized “for profit.” 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (2012). Furthermore, the Native 
corporations have shareholders while non-profits may not have shareholders. Id. 
 10. See generally Daniel William Fessler, The Alaska Corporations Code: The 
Forty-Ninth State Claims the Middle Ground, 7 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1990) (explaining 
the distinctive aspects of the Alaska Corporations Code). 
 11. They could potentially become limited liability companies, but their duties 
to members would not be dramatically different from their duties to shareholders. 
 12. See H.R. 49, 29th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2015) (proposing a new 
incorporation method for businesses). 
 13. Id. 
 14. RESPONSIFY, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW TRACKER, 
http://www.socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps (last visited Sept. 22, 2016) (United 
States map displaying state legislation on benefit corporations from 2009 to 2016). 
 15. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.010). 
 16. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.60.030–10.60.500). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.300). 
33.2 NOTE - ROBINSON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2016  7:10 PM 
332 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:2 
forty-five years.19 Part II describes the emergence of the benefit 
corporation entity in the U.S. and examines the implications of its possible 
introduction in Alaska. Part III argues that Alaska should seize the 
opportunity to pass a benefit corporation statute, and thus give Native 
corporations the chance to consider an alternative legal entity. 
I. OVERVIEW OF ANCSA’S ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS 
Following Alaska’s first major oil strike in 1957 and its statehood two 
years later, oil companies began advocating20 for resolution of the 
uncertainty around Alaska Native land ownership in the state.21 Congress 
enacted ANCSA in 1971 as a comprehensive response.22 The statute deals 
almost entirely with land.23 Under ANCSA, Alaska Natives gave up “any 
claim” they might have to about 360 million acres of land in exchange for 
45.5 million acres and $962.5 million.24 
ANCSA required that regional corporations be formed “for profit” 
under Alaska law to manage these assets.25 ANCSA also required the 
formation of village corporations, and some assets were transferred to 
these local entities.26 Village corporations typically received the “surface 
estate.”27 Regional corporations received some of the surface estate, but 
also acquired the resource-rich “subsurface estate.”28 
 
 19. Anderson, supra note 5, at 31 (“Passage of the ANCSA in 1971 was 
undoubtedly the most important event in the history of Alaska Native people 
since 1867. If one views it from the perspective of the state and oil companies’ 
intent on development of oil and gas at Prudhoe Bay, ANCSA was a resounding 
success.”) 
 20. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 3–4; see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 28 (stating 
that possibly the most important pressure behind ANCSA’s enactment “was the 
fact that the state and federal governments’ effort to construct a pipeline to 
transport oil from newly discovered oil fields . . . was thwarted by Native claims 
to aboriginal title.”). 
 21. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 116. 
 22. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 
(1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012)). 
 23. See DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN 
LAWS 35 (3d ed. 2012) (describing ANCSA as having a “relatively narrow purpose” 
to settle land claims and explaining that the statute “primarily describes the 
express procedures whereby land settlement was to be achieved.”) [hereinafter 
CASE & VOLUCK]; see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 40 (stating that ANCSA did 
not address tribal self-governance issues or hunting, fishing, and gathering rights 
of Alaska Natives). 
 24. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 109. 
 25. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d); twelve regional corporations were created, plus a 
thirteenth for Alaska Natives not residing in Alaska. Id. § 1606(a), (c). 
 26. 43 U.S.C. § 1607(a). 
 27. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 171–72. 
 28. Id. 
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Each Alaska Native person alive on December 18, 197129 was entitled 
to receive one hundred shares in a corresponding regional corporation.30 
Share transfer was temporarily restricted by ANCSA31 and later restricted 
indefinitely by the so-called 1991 amendments to ANCSA.32 ANCSA 
generally exempted the Native corporations from the federal securities 
laws.33 Further, ANCSA compels the regional Native corporations to 
share their timber and subsurface natural resource revenues with each 
other proportionally.34 Regional corporations must also share revenue 
with the village corporations.35 Otherwise, Native corporation 
shareholders are treated like other corporate shareholders under the 
Alaska Corporations Code.36 Shareholders elect a board of directors that 
owes fiduciary duties, and they count on receiving regular dividend 
payments from the corporation.37 Although their financial track record 
has been mixed,38 Native corporations have developed businesses in oil 
 
 29. Native corporations have taken different approaches on whether to issue 
shares to younger people. See generally CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 190 
(noting that most corporations are weighing these interests in moving forward). 
 30. § 1606(g)(1)(A). 
 31. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 159. 
 32. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.07[3][b][ii][C] (Nell Jessup 
Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (“The major feature of the 
1991 amendments is the indefinite extension of restrictions on alienation of Native 
corporation stock.”). 
 33. 43 U.S.C. § 1625; see also CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 196 (describing 
the amendments to ANCSA that made the exemptions indefinite and detailing 
Alaska’s state securities regulations, which are applicable to the largest Native 
corporations). 
 34. § 1606(i)–(m); see also CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 175–76 (stating that 
after extensive litigation over the revenue sharing provision, a settlement to 
modify it was ultimately agreed upon). 
 35. § 1606(i)–(m); see also CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 175–76 (stating that 
after extensive litigation over the revenue sharing provision, a settlement to 
modify it was ultimately agreed upon). 
 36. See, e.g., Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc., 294 P.3d 76 (Alaska 2012) (holding 
that a Native corporation did not have to list the candidates not recommended by 
its board in its proxy materials). Admittedly, Native Corporations have received 
significant special treatment under federal law, such as being able to sell their 
taxable losses during the 1980s, CASE & VOLUCK supra note 23, at 180–81, and 
receive federal contracting preferences, Robert O’Harrow Jr., For Many with Stake 
in Alaska Native Corporations, Promise of Better Life Remains Unfulfilled, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 30, 2010, 10:53 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/09/29/AR2010092906318.html. 
 37. See, e.g., Holmes v. Wolf, 243 P.3d 584 (Alaska 2010) (interpreting the 
Alaska Corporations Code in ruling on a plaintiff’s claim for director’s breach of 
fiduciary duties against Leisnoi, Inc., a village corporation); see also MITCHELL, 
supra note 4, at 509 (describing how unemployed Alaska Natives may need to live 
off their dividend checks). 
 38. See Jennifer LaFleur and Michael Grabell, Alaska Native Corporations 
Financials, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 15, 2010, 8:00 PM), 
http://projects.propublica.org/tables/alaska-native-corporations-financials 
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and gas, mining, construction, timber, real estate, and a variety of other 
areas.39 They have also taken advantage of preferences that allow them to 
receive discounts in Federal Communications Commission auctions by 
participating in high-profile transactions with other major U.S. 
corporations like Dish Network.40 
A. The Purpose of the Alaska Native Corporations 
At their incorporation, shareholders, legislators, and other 
stakeholders ascribed an array of purposes to Alaska Native corporations. 
Congress mandated the corporate form for Alaska Native corporations in 
ANCSA because legislators and Alaska Native advocates for the statute 
believed it would promote self-determination for Alaska Natives.41 
Legislators also hoped to integrate Alaska Natives into the framework of 
American capitalism.42 ANCSA said the statute’s settlement “should be 
accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in conformity with the real 
economic and social needs of Natives, without litigation, with maximum 
participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and property . 
. . .”43 
The regional corporations’ original certificates of incorporation 
include the standard corporate language,44 such as the broad statement 
that the corporation will be formed to engage in “any and all lawful 
 
(“[Native corporation] performance, as measured by revenue growth and 
dividends paid to shareholders, varies widely.”); see also Stephen Colt, Alaska 
Natives and the “New Harpoon”: Economic Performance of the ANCSA Regional 
Corporations, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 155, 155–56 (2005) (stating that 
Native corporations mostly performed poorly for their first twenty years of 
existence with some notable exceptions). 
 39. Colt, supra note 38, at 161–62. 
 40. Shalini Ramachandran, Kate Linebaugh & Ryan Knutson, Behind Dish 
Wireless Coup, Ties to Alaskan Native Groups, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-dish-wireless-coup-ties-to-alaskan-
native-groups-1423017463; see also Colt, supra note 38, at 162 (describing how Cook 
Inlet Region Inc. used federal preferences to participate in broadcast deals with 
other companies). 
 41. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 541. 
 42. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 188; see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra 
note 32, § 4.07[3][b][ii][B] (stating that ANCSA was “calculated to speed 
assimilation of Alaska Natives into corporate America”). 
 43. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (2012). 
 44. Corporations typically state that they are formed for “any lawful 
purpose,” or use similar language in their corporate charter. This allows them to 
avoid ultra vires lawsuits. See, e.g., Askinuk Corp. v. Lower Yukon School Dist., 
214 P.3d 259, 266 n.14 (Alaska 2009) (defining ultra vires as an action which is 
outside a corporation’s powers as governed by corporate law and its articles of 
incorporation). 
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enterprises, businesses, undertakings and activities . . . .”45 However, 
some Native corporations went further in their charters. Ahtna, Inc., for 
example, adopted as one of its corporate purposes: “to promote the 
economic, social, cultural and personal well-being of all Natives” in its 
ANCSA-designated region.46 Bristol Bay Native Corporation listed 
among its corporate purposes the goal of furthering the interests of its 
stockholders, but also promoting the “economic development” of 
stockholders and villages.47 Native corporations also listed land 
management as another corporate purpose in their original charters.48 
Native corporations have often taken on roles more commonly 
associated with governments than with corporate entities because 
ANCSA did nothing to address questions surrounding tribal self-
governance.49 Many of the Native corporation mission statements reveal 
that they are guardians of Native culture,50 as much as managers of 
shareholder value. On its website, Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI) states 
that its mission is: “to promote the economic and social well-being and 
Alaska Native heritage of our shareholders, now and into the future, 
through prudent stewardship of the company’s resources, while 
furthering self-sufficiency among CIRI shareholders and their families.”51 
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation’s website states that the corporation’s 
mission is to: “actively manage our businesses, our lands and resources, 
our investments, and our relationships to enhance Iñupiaq cultural and 
economic freedom – with continuity, responsibility, and integrity.”52 Job 
 
 45. CERT. OF INC., SEALASKA CORP., ART. III (June 16, 1972). 
 46. CERT. OF INC., AHTNA, INC., ART. III (June 23, 1972). 
 47. CERT. OF INC., BRISTOL BAY NATIVE CORP., ART. III (June 13, 1972). 
 48. See, e.g., id. (listing land management as a corporate purpose). 
 49. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 35–36 (describing how ANCSA was drafted 
to focus on land and stating that as a result it failed to include any mechanisms 
promoting Alaska Native self-government other than the Native corporations 
themselves); see also Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 
523 (1998) (holding that land Alaska Natives received under ANCSA is not 
“Indian country,” thus limiting tribal jurisdiction over the land). 
 50. It is also interesting to compare the statements on Native corporation 
websites and in the original charters with the statements made by the Native 
corporations’ associated nonprofits. See, e.g., Mission and History, BRISTOL BAY 
NATIVE ASS’N, http://www.bbna.com/about-us/mission-and-history (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2016) (“The Mission of [Bristol Bay Native Ass’n] is to maintain and 
promote a strong regional organization . . . to serve as a unified voice to provide 
social, economic, cultural, educational opportunities and initiatives to benefit the 
Tribes and the Native people of Bristol Bay.”). 
 51. Our CIRI, Our Values, COOK INLET REGION, INC., 
http://www.ciri.com/our-corporation/mission-vision-and-values/ (last visited 
Oct. 2, 2016). 
 52. We Are ASRC, ARCTIC SLOPE REGIONAL CORP., 
https://www.asrc.com/Pages/We%20are%20ASRC.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 
2016). 
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creation has been a priority for many Native corporations.53 Village 
corporations have also sought to provide special financial assistance for 
elderly members of their communities.54 
During the decades after ANCSA’s enactment, the Alaska Native 
leaders who negotiated ANCSA and incorporated the Native 
corporations also formed non-profit organizations that focus on cultural, 
educational, and health objectives.55 Every regional corporation and some 
of the village corporations now have corresponding non-profits that 
provide health and social services.56 The regional Native corporations 
provide millions of dollars in annual funding for their corresponding 
regional non-profits.57 ANCSA amendments allowing for “settlement 
trusts” and the provision of benefits to shareholders’ families have 
provided Native corporations with programs they can use to support 
Alaska Native communities.58 For an ordinary corporation, programs like 
these would violate corporate law’s mandate that all shareholders of the 
same class receive equal distributions.59 However, ANCSA has 
preempted state corporate law in order to allow Native corporations to 
use them.60 
B. Criticism of the Native Corporations and Their Perceived 
Shortcomings 
This section outlines three of the most common criticisms of Alaska 
Native corporations: (1) overemphasis on dividend payouts to 
 
 53. Gigi Berardi, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) – Whose 
Settlement Was It? An Overview of Salient Issues, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 
131, 134 n.17 (2005). 
 54. See, e.g., Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 939 P.2d 1320, 1323–24 (Alaska 1997) 
(describing a village corporation’s plan to compensate its original elderly 
shareholders). 
 55. See, e.g., Mission and History, BRISTOL BAY NATIVE ASS’N, 
http://www.bbna.com/about-us/mission-and-history/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) 
(stating that the BBNA was incorporated in 1973); Perpetuating and Enhancing 
Southeast Alaska Native Cultures, SEALASKA HERITAGE, 
http://www.sealaskaheritage.org/about (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (stating that 
Sealaska Heritage was formed by the Sealaska corporation in 1980); see also CASE 
& VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 178 (“The regional nonprofit Native corporations were 
the advocacy organizations that pursued the settlement of the Alaska Native 
claims as well as the ANCSA-designated incorporators of the regional profit 
corporations.”). 
 56. BOB POE, 2014 ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, ANCSA REGIONAL ASSOCIATION 6 
(2014),http://ancsaregional.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/ANCSA_economic-report.pdf. 
 57. Id. 
 58. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 197. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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shareholders, (2) the poor fit of corporate law to Alaska Native culture, 
and (3) the failure of corporations to improve the economic status of 
Alaska Natives. Much of this criticism is essentially an argument that the 
corporate form is the wrong legal entity for Native corporations.61 In 
particular, critics charge that Native corporations are too focused on 
maximizing dividend payouts and therefore neglect their broader 
purposes.62 Ultimately, this is a critique of the legal requirement that as 
corporations they must put shareholder value ahead of other objectives. 
Corporations are legally obligated to maximize value for their 
shareholders, or else their directors risk liability.63 Some states have 
passed stakeholder statutes that allow corporate directors to consider 
stakeholders other than shareholders—such as employees or community 
members—when making decisions.64 However, Alaska is one of the few 
states that has not enacted a constituency statute.65 Alaska corporations, 
including Native corporations, are therefore legally obligated to ensure 
that every decision they make is somehow related to boosting shareholder 
value.66 In most situations, the business judgment rule applies67 and gives 
corporations broad leeway to make decisions as long as they can show 
that the decision may boost shareholder value in some way.68 Like most 
corporations, Alaska Native corporations are rarely challenged on the 
grounds that a proposed action is ultra vires.69 Still, their flexibility is 
 
 61. See MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 507 (“[I]n practice, the principal . . . standard 
Alaska Natives have employed to measure the success of regional and village 
corporations has been the size and frequency of dividend checks.”); Chaffee, supra 
note 6, at 134 (“Directors and officers are burdened with corporate fiduciary 
duties to achieve financial success while trying to represent traditional interests, 
such as conservation of the land and preservation of subsistence rights.”). 
 62. See supra note 61; see also Howard, supra note 6 (arguing that Native 
corporations should not overly focus on dividends). 
 63. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-
Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 146 (2012) (“Ultimately, 
any for-profit corporation that sells shares to others has to be accountable to its 
stockholders for delivering a financial return.”). 
 64. Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and 
Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 122 
(2004). 
 65. Nathan E. Standley, Note, Lessons Learned from the Capitulation of the 
Constituency Statute, 4 ELON L. REV. 209, 217 (2012). Stakeholder statutes are also 
sometimes referred to as constituency statutes. Id. at 209. 
 66. See Strine, supra note 63, at 146–48 (providing background on shareholder 
primacy). 
 67. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980) 
(stating that “judges are not business experts” and that fact underlies the business 
judgment rule). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Askinuk Corp. v. Lower 
Yukon Sch. Dist., 214 P.3d 259, 266 n.14 (Alaska 2009) (stating that a Native 
corporation’s decision to lease land to a school district for one dollar a year was 
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limited by the requirement they put shareholders first and treat all 
shareholders equally.70 Even the business judgment rule mandates that 
corporations show they are promoting shareholder interests in some 
way.71 
Critics have also argued that corporate law is a poor cultural fit for 
Alaska Natives.72 Specifically, some Alaska Natives have said that buying 
into corporate law doctrines was a departure from their heritage.73 Some 
Alaska Native communities still follow a subsistence lifestyle, meaning 
that they engage in hunting, fishing, or gathering for the purpose of 
obtaining food, or for cultural or traditional reasons.74 The rights and 
responsibilities of corporate shareholders often conflict with this lifestyle. 
Alaska Natives also have a sociocultural relationship with land, and they 
expect Native corporations to be stewards of land rather than simply asset 
managers.75 The environment holds a position in Alaska Native culture 
that it does not necessarily assume for corporate managers. Corporate 
managers must view land as an asset to be managed for the benefit of 
shareholder payouts.76 Alaska Native corporations’ fiduciary duties to 
their shareholders have made it difficult for them to help Native 
communities maintain traditional cultural or subsistence lifestyles.77 
Many Alaska Natives have embraced modern amenities, even in areas 
where doing so conflicts with their traditional lifestyles.78 Nearly every 
Congress since ANCSA was passed in 1971 has amended the statute to 
address various concerns,79 and the idea that the federal government 
 
not ultra vires). 
 70. See Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 939 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Alaska 1997) 
(holding that Native corporation program meant to compensate elderly 
shareholders was illegal); but see Sierra v. Goldbelt, Inc., 25 P.3d 697, 702 (Alaska 
2001) (holding that ANCSA authorized a Native corporation program to 
compensate the elderly). 
 71. Jesse Finfrock & Eric Talley, Social Entrepreneurship and Uncorporations, 
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1867, 1870–71 (2014). 
 72. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 132. 
 73. See, e.g., MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 520 (stating that Alaska Native rights 
activist and ANCSA advocate Willie Hensley believed that requiring all villages 
to form a corporation was a mistake). 
 74. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, 265–66 (stating that defining 
“subsistence” is “politically difficult,” but that the term can encompass “economic 
and physical reliance,” as well as culture and tradition). 
 75. See MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 521 (describing Alaska Natives’ view that 
“the land is their life” and the “contention that Alaska Natives have a 
psychological relationship with, and spiritual attachment to, land that is different, 
and in some way qualitatively superior to, that of non-Natives . . . .”). 
 76. Id. at 521–23. 
 77. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 132. 
 78. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 512–13. 
 79. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 165. 
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could simply direct the integration of Alaska Natives with American 
capitalism and thereby solve their problems has been mostly rejected.80 
Still, the most damaging criticism of Alaska Native corporations is 
that they have failed to boost the economic well-being of Alaska 
Natives.81 While their financial performance has varied widely, the 
Native corporations have lost money overall and some have had to 
declare bankruptcy.82 By the 1980s, both regional and village corporations 
were struggling financially due largely to the costs of implementing 
ANCSA.83 According to David S. Case and David A. Voluck, the Native 
corporations were effectively refinanced in the 1980s by a provision in the 
federal tax code that allowed them to sell their net operating losses to 
profitable companies.84 During this period, sales of operating losses 
generated a return of $1.25 billion for the Native corporations and 
restored many of them to financial stability.85 This bailed out many 
Native corporations.86 
Despite the government bailout of the Native corporations, many 
Alaska Natives still face dire economic circumstances in their personal 
lives. The percentage of Alaska Natives living in poverty is almost double 
the national rate.87 Native corporations are commonly criticized for 
failing to bring jobs back to Native communities.88 Lucrative management 
jobs at Native corporations are often held by non-Native executives.89 
Native shareholders receive dividend payments, which often function as 
welfare payments.90 Native corporations have to a meaningful extent 
 
 80. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 32, § 4.07[3][b][ii][C] (“Alaska Natives 
have been included expressly among the beneficiaries in most major Indian 
legislation since the enactment of ANCSA, based on the continuing fiduciary 
relationship between the federal government and Alaska Natives. These measures 
indicate that Congress has largely abandoned the assimilationist objectives 
manifested in 1971.”). 
 81. O’Harrow, supra note 36. 
 82. Colt, supra note 38, at 155–56, 161. 
 83. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 179. 
 84. Id. at 186; see also MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 518 (“In 1986, when [U.S. 
Senator] Ted Stevens arranged for Congress to insert the provision in the Internal 
Revenue Code that authorized ANCSA corporations to sell operating losses, 
southeast Alaska corporations sold most of their remaining timber at fire-sale 
prices in order to generate losses that they then sold to other corporations for cash, 
much of which was distributed to shareholders as dividends.”). 
 85. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 181. 
 86. Id. 
 87. STEPHANIE MARTIN & ALEXANDRA HILL, THE CHANGING ECONOMIC STATUS 
OF ALASKA NATIVES, 1970-2007 1 (Institute of Social and Economic Research, 
University of Alaska Anchorage ed., 2009), 
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/webnote/WebNote5.pdf. 
 88. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 534–35. 
 89. O’Harrow, supra note 36. 
 90. See MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 509 (citing an Anchorage Daily News article 
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failed to boost economic growth, especially in the remote regions where 
many Alaska Natives live.91 In addition to these distributional problems, 
tension now exists over how best to incorporate younger Alaska Natives 
as corporate shareholders.92 
In sum, the Native corporations have not only failed to meet their 
broader goals as guardians of culture, heritage, and land; they have also 
failed by traditional corporate measures like profitability. 
II. OVERVIEW OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS IN THE U.S. AND 
POSSIBLE USE IN ALASKA 
A benefit corporation is a business that operates for profit, yet is 
legally obligated to consider how it will benefit the public.93 Unlike a 
constituency statute, which makes considering groups other than 
shareholders permissive, the benefit corporation legal entity makes it 
mandatory for directors to consider how corporate actions will affect 
constituencies other than shareholders.94  Under the model legislation, an 
existing corporation can convert to a benefit corporation by getting 
approval from two-thirds of its shareholders or by amending its charter.95 
The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, which is promoted by a 
nonprofit called B Lab,96 requires that benefit corporations create a 
general public benefit, which it describes as a “material positive impact 
on society and the environment . . . .”97 Corporations can optionally 
identify additional specific public benefits.98 For example, these may 
 
describing the possibility that some Alaska Natives may need to live off their 
dividend checks due to widespread unemployment). 
 91. See O’Harrow, supra note 36 (describing lack of benefits to Alaska natives 
that live a subsistence lifestyle). 
 92. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 186 (describing the approaches taken 
by Native corporations on whether to issue shares to children of original 
shareholders). 
 93. See generally Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in 
Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007 (2013) (analyzing and criticizing benefit 
corporation statutes). 
 94. Id. at 1025–26. 
 95. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 104(a), 102 (B LAB, Draft with Explanatory 
Comments, Apr. 4, 2016), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legisl
ation_4_16.pdf. 
 96. B Lab encourages states to adopt the model legislation. Loewenstein, supra 
note 93 at 1013. It also reviews benefit corporations and designates them as 
“Certified B Corporation[s]” if they pay a fee and meet certain conditions. Id. 
 97. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (2016), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legisl
ation_4_16.pdf. 
 98. Id. § 201(b). 
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include promoting economic opportunities for a particular community.99 
The benefit corporation is required to focus on creating or pursuing the 
stated public benefits when it makes any decision.100 In other words, it is 
not allowed to focus solely on boosting shareholder value.101 Shareholder 
value is only one of several factors the directors of a benefit corporation 
must consider, along with other objectives like positively affecting the 
environment.102 Under B Lab’s model legislation, the corporation must 
appoint an independent benefit director.103 This director supervises the 
corporation’s commitment to pursuing public benefits and considering 
various constituencies.104 The benefit corporations must also issue an 
annual benefit report to update shareholders and the public on its 
progress in pursuing public benefits.105 The model legislation also 
includes a provision for a benefit enforcement proceeding, which would 
make directors liable if they failed to pursue a public benefit or focused 
only on boosting shareholder value.106 
In sum, the Business Corporation Model Legislation goes much 
further than a constituency statute or nonlegal ideals like corporate social 
responsibility. The model legislation requires directors to actively work 
toward public benefits, or risk legal liability.107 
A.  Adoption of U.S. Benefit Corporation Statutes 
Since 2010, a majority of states have enacted a benefit corporation 
statute.108 While state legislators have embraced benefit corporations, 
business promoters have not flocked to the new entity. Relatively few 
businesses have chosen to take advantage of the new laws by 
incorporating as benefit corporations.109 However, some evidence 
suggests that the entity’s growth trajectory is tracking that of the limited 
liability company.110 
 
 99. Id. § 102. 
 100. Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1013–15. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1007. 
 103. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 302(b). 
 104. Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1023–25. 
 105. Id. at 1015–20. 
 106. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 102, 305(a)(1). 
 107. Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1020. 
 108. Maryland enacted the first benefit corporation statute in 2010. RESPONSIFY, 
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW TRACKER, http://www.socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2016). 
 109. Finfrock & Talley, supra note 71, at 1869. 
 110. Id. 
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In addition, benefit corporations are the subject of significant 
skepticism, especially from legal scholars.111 One view is that benefit 
corporations are unnecessary because traditional corporations already 
have the freedom to spend their money just about any way they choose, 
as long as their spending has some link to the benefit of shareholders.112 
William H. Clark, Jr., the drafter of the model legislation, rebuts this 
premise.113 Clark argues that the requirement of shareholder primacy 
dating to the Michigan Supreme Court’s 1919 holding in Dodge v. Ford114 
is still pervasive in corporate law.115 In Clark’s view, the benefit 
corporation statute provides a meaningful alternative because it requires 
corporate directors to consider factors other than shareholder value.116 
A cynical observer could also characterize the decision to become a 
benefit corporation as a public relations or marketing gimmick.117 Many 
of the businesses that have chosen to become benefit corporations are 
consumer-oriented. Ice cream chain Ben & Jerry’s and apparel brand 
Patagonia are two examples of benefit corporations well known to U.S. 
consumers.118 Part of the legal entity’s appeal for these businesses was 
likely the opportunity to show their customers that they are socially 
conscious brands. 
In addition, some legal scholars view the Model Benefit Corporation 
Legislation as impractical because directors are forced to make 
unstructured decisions about vague objectives.119 Professor Mark J. 
Loewenstein argues that benefit corporation directors have an 
“impossible task” under the model legislation.120 In his view, a benefit 
corporation that is committed both to protecting the environment and 
bringing jobs to its local community must ultimately choose between 
 
 111. See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1036 (arguing that benefit 
corporation directors have an “impossible task”). 
 112. See id. (“Some have argued that benefit corporation legislation is 
unnecessary because current corporate statutes provide the necessary flexibility 
to allow social entrepreneurs to pursue non-profit maximizing strategies.”). 
 113. William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations are 
Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 825–
29 (2012). 
 114. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 115. Clark & Babson, supra note 113, at 825–29. 
 116. Id. at 840. 
 117. See Jena McGregor, What Etsy, Patagonia and Warby Parker Have in Common, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-
leadership/wp/2015/04/20/what-etsy-patagonia-and-warby-parker-have-in-
common/ (“Some companies that go through the [B Lab] certification see it as a 
marketing tool that helps promote their do-gooder business approach in a 
credible way to customers, potential employees or socially minded investors.”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1011. 
 120. Id. at 1036. 
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these ideals.121 Furthermore, Delaware Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. argues 
that corporate directors are entrusted with other people’s money and 
therefore can only be tasked with the goal of making money for 
investors.122 Strine argues that it is not feasible for directors to use outside 
investors’ money to achieve social goals, especially because there are so 
many different social goals to pursue.123 In sum, corporate law experts 
remain skeptical about benefit corporations even though a majority of 
state legislatures have now enacted benefit corporation statutes. Alaska’s 
legislature can take these critiques into consideration when it considers 
adopting its own benefit corporation statute. 
B. The Benefit Corporation Bill Recently Proposed in the Alaska 
House of Representatives 
The Alaska House of Representative considered passing a benefit 
corporation statute this year.124 The proposed statute largely tracked B 
Lab’s model legislation and contained relatively insignificant deviations 
from it.125 Although the bill had bipartisan support from legislators, it did 
not pass in 2016.126 According to a legislative aide for one of the bill’s 
sponsors, similar legislation may be reintroduced in a future legislative 
session.127 The bill required benefit corporations to add a benefit 
director.128 It also required all directors to consider a variety of 
constituencies.129 Although it did not use the phrase “benefit enforcement 
proceeding,” this appears to have been only a semantic deviation from 
the model legislation because it included a provision that put effectively 
the same scheme in place.130 
Alaska’s benefit corporation bill did not mention the Native 
corporations, apparently affording them the same treatment as other 
 
 121. Id. at 1029. 
 122. See Strine, supra note 63, at 150–51 (arguing that it is unrealistic for 
directors to aspire to goals other than shareholder wealth maximization). 
 123. Id. 
 124. H.R. 49, 29th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2015). 
 125. Compare Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 1–3 with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 101–
402. 
 126. Alaska H.R. 49 (including sponsors from both parties such as Republican 
Rep. Paul Seaton and Democrat Rep. Jonathan Kreiss-Tomkins); House of 
Representatives, THE ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE, 
http://house.legis.state.ak.us/rep.php?id=san (last visited Sept. 15, 2016); e-mail 
from Taneeka Hansen, legislative aide to Alaska Rep. Paul Seaton, to author (Nov. 
7, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hansen e-mail]. 
 127. Hansen e-mail, supra note 126.  
 128. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.160). 
 129. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.100). 
 130. Compare id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.300) with MODEL BENEFIT 
CORP. LEGIS. §§ 102, 305(a)(1). 
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existing corporations.131 The bill was not proposed to reform Native 
corporations, but was instead introduced for many of the same reasons 
that other states have adopted benefit corporation statutes—to give 
business promoters another choice in entity formation.132 Under the bill, 
Alaska corporations, including Native corporations, could have 
converted to benefit corporations by a two-thirds shareholder vote to 
amend their articles of incorporation.133 
III. A PROPOSAL TO CONSIDER THE BENEFITS OF THE BENEFIT 
CORPORATION ENTITY FOR ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS 
Alaska should enact a benefit corporation statute because it would 
give Native corporations a legal entity that better aligns with their 
purpose. Native corporations have frequently been criticized as a poor 
legal entity to further the purposes of ANCSA.134 The benefit corporation 
entity offers Alaska Native corporations a promising alternative. 
A. Benefit Corporation Legislation Offers an Attainable and 
Significant Reform Opportunity for Native Corporations 
This section will explain why the benefit corporation entity is a better 
reform opportunity for Native corporations than (1) attempting to convert 
Native corporations to non-profits or (2) enacting a constituency statute 
in Alaska. Enacting a benefit corporation statute is the most attainable 
opportunity to significantly reform the Native corporations. A 
widespread conversion of Native corporations into non-profits is 
impractical. ANCSA directed the regional corporations to organize as for-
profit businesses under state law,135 and amending ANCSA is a federal 
legislative task.136 Furthermore, non-profits are not allowed to have 
shareholders or pay out a portion of their profits as dividends.137 Taking 
the ability to pay dividends away from the regional Native corporations 
 
 131. Telephone Interview with Taneeka Hansen, legislative aide to Alaska Rep. 
Paul Seaton (Feb. 22, 2016); see generally Alaska H.R. 49. 
 132. See generally Alaska H.R. 49 (creating alternative corporate form); see also 
SPONSOR STATEMENT: CSHB 49 (L&C), ALASKA STATE H.R., 
http://www.housemajority.org/2015/02/18/sponsor-statement-cshb-49-lc/ 
(stating that the goal of the bill is to “give businesses more flexibility and control 
over their decisions and to provide investors with a clear social investment 
option,” and making no mention of Alaska Native issues in particular). 
 133. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.60.010(2), 
10.60.700(a)). 
 134. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 131–43. 
 135. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (2012). 
 136. Id. § 1606(e). 
 137. ALASKA STAT. § 10.20.136. 
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would be far too drastic. Professor Eric C. Chaffee, writing in 2008 before 
the emergence of benefit corporations, argued for reforms that would 
allow Native corporations to operate with “nonprofit goals.”138 A benefit 
corporation statute would allow Native corporations to do precisely that. 
The benefit corporation structure, which only emerged as an option for 
states in 2010,139 requires directors to function somewhat like a non-profit 
board. They must consider how their decisions will affect constituencies 
and further a variety of public benefits.140 Native corporations could also 
convert to benefit corporations without jeopardizing their ability to pay 
dividends to shareholders.141 
Although Alaska does not currently have a constituency statute,142 
enacting one would also fail to provide Native corporations with a 
meaningful reform opportunity. Constituency statutes, also known as 
stakeholder statutes, are essentially just takeover defense mechanisms, 
and mergers and acquisitions are not generally relevant to Native 
corporations.143 As noted earlier in this Note, benefit corporation statutes 
make mandatory what stakeholder statutes make permissive. 
Corporations already have considerable flexibility to make decisions and 
take actions that relate in some way to benefitting their shareholders.144 
Constituency statutes simply give them cover to do so when a takeover is 
imminent, adding nothing to the goal of promoting public benefits.145 
B. Benefit Corporation Legislation Allows Alaska to Initiate Native 
Corporation Reform without Federal Involvement 
A benefit corporation statute is an ideal reform opportunity for 
Native corporations because Alaska could pass a benefit corporation 
statute on its own without involving other states or the federal 
government. Enacting a benefit corporation statute would not require an 
amendment to ANCSA.146 Michael M. Pacheco has called for a federal 
 
 138. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 146–47. 
 139. RESPONSIFY, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW TRACKER, 
http://www.socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps (last visited Sept. 22, 2016). 
 140. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.100). 
 141. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.700(c)). 
 142. Standley, supra note 65, at 217. 
 143. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 196–97 (stating that no regional 
corporations have merged and few village corporation mergers have occurred). 
 144. See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1036 (“Some have argued that 
benefit corporation legislation is unnecessary because current corporate statutes 
provide the necessary flexibility to allow social entrepreneurs to pursue non-
profit maximizing strategies.”). 
 145. Standley, supra note 65, at 218–19. 
 146. See Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.010(2)) 
(allowing corporations to change form by amendment to their articles of 
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Model Business Corporation Act that would only apply to Indian 
tribes.147 In his view, this would allow Indian corporations to achieve 
greater independence from state laws and regulations.148 However, 
Alaska’s courts already have experience deciding cases about Native 
corporation issues.149 In light of this experience, it does not make sense to 
cede key disputes about Native corporations to the federal courts. 
Enacting a benefit corporation statute is a sensible approach because it is 
a local solution. Alaska can pass the legislation on its own without any 
federal involvement or coordination with other states required. 
Moreover, nothing in the language of ANCSA would seem to preclude 
Native corporations from becoming benefit corporations.150 
In addition, the introduction of the benefit corporation legal entity in 
Alaska may prevent the need for future changes to ANCSA. Congress 
typically amends ANCSA every couple  years.151 These amendments have 
given Native corporations the ability to distribute payouts 
disproportionately to support certain groups, such as the elderly or 
shareholders’ families.152 Benefit corporations would give Native 
corporations a greater level of flexibility on payout distribution and other 
confining aspects of traditional corporate law, such as shareholder 
primacy. Constant federal revisions to ANCSA in order to preempt state 
corporate law would become less of a necessity. This could better position 
Native corporations for the long term by reducing their reliance on the 
federal government’s biannual amendments to ANCSA, which have 
become customary to fix problems as they arise. 
The benefit corporation would also be a better model than the 
current disjointed structure in which each regional Native corporation 
donates money to an associated non-profit. Corporations are allowed to 
donate to non-profits, but it may be difficult for shareholders to force 
them to commit to do so. Through a benefit corporation, Native 
corporations could effectively merge with their associated non-profits 
and streamline their efforts and operations. Corporations could also 
 
incorporation). 
 147. Michael M. Pacheco, Toward a Truer Sense of Sovereignty: Fiduciary Duty in 
Indian Corporations, 39 S.D. L. REV. 49, 90 (1994). 
 148. Id. at 91. 
 149. See, e.g., Nenana Fuel Co. v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 834 P.3d 1229 (Alaska 
1992) (considering whether Native corporations are sovereign entities). 
 150. ANCSA required the regional corporations to incorporate as for-profit 
businesses under state law. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (2012). The village corporations 
can also incorporate under state law, but may be set up as non-profits. § 1607(a). 
 151. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 165 (“Enacted on December 18, 1971, 
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was to be amended by nearly every 
Congress for the next thirty-five years.”). 
 152. Id. at 197. 
33.2 NOTE - ROBINSON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2016  7:10 PM 
2016 THE BENEFITS OF A B CORP STATUTE 347 
commit to provide specified levels of funding to the services that are 
currently provided by the regional Native corporations’ associated non-
profits. 
C. The Chance to Provide Native Corporations an Alternative Legal 
Entity is Sufficient Reason for Alaska to Enact a Benefit 
Corporation Statute 
In Alaska, the chance to provide Native corporations with an 
alternative legal entity is sufficient reason to enact a benefit corporation 
statute. While benefit corporations are the subject of significant 
skepticism, they have unique promise in Alaska because of the reform 
opportunity they offer to Native corporations. 
When the criticism of the benefit corporation legal entity is analyzed 
in relation to Native corporations, much is either irrelevant or mitigated. 
Native corporations have a legal obligation to boost shareholder value, 
but they are already viewed as having other constituencies.153 The benefit 
corporation entity would force them to take these other groups into 
account. As benefit corporations, Native corporations would need to 
pursue public benefits, both general and specific.154 According to the 
model legislation, a corporation can identify a “specific public benefit,” 
such as “providing low-income or underserved individuals or 
communities with beneficial products or services.”155 This language 
would allow Native corporations to focus on providing benefits to a 
specific tribe or village, or for Alaska Natives in a designated region. 
Within the benefit corporation structure, independent benefit 
directors would hold Native corporation directors accountable for 
pursuing public benefits.156 Annual benefit reports would also subject 
directors to public scrutiny.157 As benefit corporations, Native 
corporation directors would be legally required to consider shareholder 
value as one of many factors.158 Shareholder value and dividend 
payments would have to be assessed alongside other considerations such 
as environmental protection, land conservation, cultural heritage, job 
creation for villages, or whatever other factors the Native corporation 
 
 153. Howard, supra note 6 (“All Native business leaders are faced with far more 
taxing demands than just creating profit. Most mission statements include 
language like ‘improving the lives of shareholders.’”). 
 154. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a)(1)(iii)–(vii). 
 155. Id. § 102. 
 156. Id. § 302(c). 
 157. Id. § 401. 
 158. Id. § 301. 
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identified ex ante.159 Becoming a benefit corporation would require a 
Native corporation to reject shareholder primacy in favor of a 
multifaceted decision-making approach that considers the needs of many 
constituencies. 
Because Native corporations often play a role in Native self-
governance,160 they are more prepared than other corporations to 
consider multiple constituencies and competing factors in their decision-
making. Professor Loewenstein has criticized the Model Benefit 
Corporation Legislation as unworkable.161 He argues that benefit 
corporation directors have an “impossible task” because they are legally 
required to weigh many different factors and consider a variety of 
constituencies in making their decisions.162 This criticism of benefit 
corporations is overly cynical. The task that the benefit corporation statute 
requires of the benefit corporation does not greatly differ from the task 
required of non-profit directors like university trustees, elected 
government officials, or any other board that is required to consider 
factors other than the bottom line. Since Native corporations already 
occupy a role in Alaskan society that somewhat parallels a government 
entity, their directors are perhaps better conceived as trustees for the 
Alaska Native population in the corporation’s respective region or 
village.163 The benefit corporation legal entity would mandate this role for 
Native corporation directors. 
However, Native corporations have been restricted in their activities 
by traditional corporate law. Amendments to ANCSA in 1987 allowed for 
the creation of “settlement trusts,” which are a vehicle for providing 
disproportionate benefits to particular members of a Native 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. See Douglas M. Branson, Still Square Pegs in Round Holes? A Look at ANCSA 
Corporations, Corporate Governance, and Indeterminate Form or Operation of Legal 
Entities, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 203, 205–06 (2007) (“Despite certificates as business 
corporations, however, ANSCA corporations . . . act as political entities . . . .”); see 
also Anderson, supra note 5, at 34–36 (describing how ANCSA was drafted to focus 
on land and stating that, as a result, it failed to include any mechanisms promoting 
Alaska Native self-government other than the Native corporations themselves, 
which were used as “administrative mechanisms” to resolve land disputes); 
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 523 (1998) (holding 
that land received by Alaska Natives under ANCSA is not “Indian country,” thus 
limiting tribal jurisdiction over the land). 
 161. Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1036. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Biographies of Native corporation directors show that they are respected 
leaders in Native communities. See, e.g., Board of Directors, ARCTIC SLOPE REGIONAL 
CORP., https://www.asrc.com/About/Pages/Board.aspx#inline14 (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2016) (describing how board seats are reserved for residents of each 
village). 
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community.164 Previous efforts by Native corporations to support 
particular groups in their communities have violated the rule that 
corporate dividends must be equally distributed.165 For example, in 
Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp.,166 the Alaska Supreme Court held that Native 
corporations could not engage in a “social welfare program” in which 
benefits would flow only to original shareholders.167 The proposed 
program was intended to support families of elderly shareholders 
through the purchase of life insurance policies.168 When the Alaska 
Supreme Court struck down the Native corporation’s shareholder life 
insurance plan, Congress responded by amending ANCSA in 1998 to 
allow the provision of disproportionate benefits to both shareholders and 
their families.169 By naming support of the elderly members of the Native 
community and their families as one of the corporation’s specific public 
benefits, the Native corporations could justify these kinds of programs if 
they were benefit corporations. Although the creation of “settlement 
trusts” and the 1998 amendments have addressed these problems 
through federal intervention, the benefit corporation would allow for an 
Alaska-specific approach to resolving such problems. 
As benefit corporation directors, Native corporation directors would 
be legally required to assume the public-serving role that to some extent 
they are already expected to fulfill. Their decisions would be no more 
arbitrary than decisions made by governments or non-profits, such as 
universities. Further, the criticism of benefit corporations as merely public 
relations or marketing gimmicks does not hold up because benefit 
corporation directors face legal liability when they neglect the factors they 
are required by the statute to consider.170 Additionally, Native 
corporations do not generally operate consumer-oriented businesses 
since they tend to concentrate their businesses in industries like timber, 
oil and gas, or mining.171 
Moreover, since Native corporations do not have outside investors, 
their relationship with shareholders is perhaps better suited to the benefit 
corporation entity structure. Chancellor Strine’s argument—that directors 
should not be deciding how to spend other people’s money on social 
causes—is not relevant for considering Native corporations as benefit 
 
 164. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 197. 
 165. Id. 
 166. 939 P.2d 1320 (Alaska 1997). 
 167. Id. at 1324. 
 168. Id. at 1322. 
 169. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 197. 
 170. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305. 
 171. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 178, 182. 
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corporations.172 Native corporation directors must make decisions about 
how to spend money and deploy resources that were entrusted to them 
by the federal government through ANCSA. They do not have outside 
investors who are expecting a return on their investment. This bolsters 
the case for Native corporations as benefit corporations. 
Furthermore, Native corporations need a significant reform 
opportunity because their financial and economic status quo is 
unsatisfactory. Native corporations were bailed out by the federal 
government in the 1980s through the use of special tax treatment.173 
Although some are well-run, successful businesses, others have 
continued to struggle.174 Many Alaska Native communities are still stuck 
in poverty or lack employment opportunities. Admittedly, changing a 
corporation’s legal entity is not itself a business strategy. No evidence 
suggests that either the financial performance of Native corporations or 
the economic conditions of Alaska Natives would improve solely due to 
the transformation of Native corporations into benefit corporations.175 
However, the financial and economic status quo of the Native 
corporations is also not a compelling reason to reject the significant 
reform opportunity that benefit corporation legislation offers. Native 
corporations need a new approach to consider. 
In sum, Alaska should enact a benefit corporation statute because it 
would provide Native corporations with a meaningful reform 
opportunity. Given the persistent criticism of Native corporations and 
their significance for Alaska Natives, the opportunities offered by this 
reform are sufficient reason for Alaska’s legislature to move forward and 
enact a benefit corporation statute. 
D. Native Corporations Should Give their Shareholders the 
Opportunity to Vote on Converting to a Benefit Corporation 
If Alaska were to enact a benefit corporation statute, the law would 
only give Native corporations an alternative legal entity to consider. The 
statute would not require them to change their legal structure.176 This is a 
reasonable approach. Alaska should not force Native corporations to 
 
 172. Strine, supra note 63, at 149–51. 
 173. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 180–81 (describing the 
congressionally-established temporary moratorium on land taxes for Native 
corporations). 
 174. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 151. 
 175. See Branson, supra note 160, at 235–36 (arguing that the choice of legal 
entity matters less than is commonly believed). 
 176. See Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.60.010(2), 
10.60.700(a)) (giving corporations’ shareholders the choice to change form by 
amendment to their articles of incorporation). 
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change their legal entity because such coercion would contravene federal 
policy. Native corporations should have the chance to decide for 
themselves whether their current legal entity status is deficient, and 
whether the benefit corporation legal entity would be worthwhile reform. 
This Note argues that conversion would be a valuable reform for Native 
corporations, but recognizes that the ultimate decision must rest with the 
Alaska Native corporations. 
Under the model legislation, Native corporations could convert to 
benefit corporations by a two-thirds shareholder vote amending their 
articles of incorporation.177 This is a high threshold. Given that many 
Alaska Natives rely on the dividend payments from their Native 
corporations for their livelihood,178 this threshold may be too high to 
allow any Native corporation to become a benefit corporation. Thus, the 
Alaska legislature may want to consider setting a lower conversion 
threshold with Native corporations in mind. 
Still, this Note argues that Alaska should give Native corporation 
shareholders the opportunity to make this choice because conversion 
would be worthwhile. Criticism of Native corporations has persisted for 
forty-five years and a significant opportunity for reform now exists. 
Alaska should seize this opportunity because Native corporations are 
integral to the state and Native communities. 
CONCLUSION 
Alaska should join the majority of states that have enacted benefit 
corporation statutes. A benefit corporation statute would provide Native 
corporations an opportunity to significantly reform their corporate 
governance within the existing framework of ANCSA. The benefit 
corporation legal entity better suits the broader intended purpose of the 
Native corporations than does their current corporate structure. 
 
 177. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305; see also Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.60.010, 10.60.700(a)(2)) (proposing a two-thirds shareholder 
vote for a conversion in line with the model legislation). 
 178. See MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 509 (citing an Anchorage Daily News article 
describing the possibility that some Alaska Natives may need to live off their 
dividend checks due to widespread unemployment). 
